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Abstract
We examined whether differential self-perception influences the salience of emo-
tional stimuli in depressive disorders, using a perceptual matching task in which geo-
metric shapes were arbitrarily assigned to the self and an unknown other. Participants 
associated shapes with personal labels (e.g. “self” or “other”). Each geometric shape 
additionally contained a happy, sad or neutral line drawing of a face. Participants 
then judged whether shape-label pairs were as originally shown or re-paired, whilst 
facial emotion was task-irrelevant. The results showed biased responses to self-rel-
evant stimuli compared to other-relevant stimuli, regardless of facial emotion, for 
both control and depressed participants. This was reflected in sensitivity (d′) and 
drift rate (v) measures, suggesting that self-bias and a bias towards emotion may 
reflect different underlying processes. We further computed bias scores by subtract-
ing the “neutral” value of each measure (acting as baseline) from the “happy” and 
“sad” values of each measure, indexing an “emotional bias” (EB) score for “self” 
and “other” separately. Compared to control participants, depressed participants ex-
hibited reduced “happy” and “sad” emotional biases, regardless of the self-relevance 
of stimuli. This finding indicates that depressed participants may exhibit generalised 
Emotion Context Insensitivity (ECI), characterised by hyopoattention to both posi-
tive and negative information, at short stimulus presentations. The implications of 
this are discussed.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Depression is a mood disorder that affects approximately 
thirty million people worldwide. It has both psychological 
and physical symptoms, such as low self-esteem, feelings 
of hopelessness and guilt, reduced concentration and ap-
petite disturbance (Clark, Beck, & Alford,  1999; Orth & 
Robins, 2013; World Health Organization, 1992). Several 
theories have sought to explain the nature of depression 
specific cognitive biases, the longest standing and most 
influential being Beck’s (1967) cognitive theory of de-
pression. The theory stipulates a “negative triad”, whereby 
individuals exhibit a negative view of the self (low self-es-
teem), a negative view of the world and a negative view 
of the future. Beck (2008) further proposed that this triad 
would result in an automatic and systematic negative bias. 
A wealth of studies using a range of experimental para-
digms support the existence of depression specific cogni-
tive biases. The majority have used “impersonal” stimuli 
not attributed to “self” and “other” conditions. A minority 
have used self-relevant stimuli that link to the concept of 
self.
It is typically observed that healthy individuals tend to 
view themselves favourably, believing they are as good as 
or better than others (Alicke, 1985; Diener, Kanazawa, Suh, 
& Oishi,  2015; Taylor & Brown,  1988). In contrast, indi-
viduals suffering from depression tend to view themselves 
negatively. An individual's self-representation is a robust 
psychological mechanism that affects a range of cognitive 
processes. Previous research has shown that when stimuli are 
perceived as self-relevant, self-concept acts as a superordi-
nate schema to influence the salience of emotional stimuli 
at later stages on information processing (Chen et al., 2014; 
Zhou et al., 2017), creating a systematic self-bias across the 
domains of attention, perception and memory (Cunningham, 
Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 
2016). Self-relevant stimuli appear to capture attention auto-
matically, receiving preferential access to cognitive resources 
even if not explicitly attended to (Alexopoulos, Muller, Ric, 
& Marendaz,  2012). Participants tend to make faster and 
more accurate judgements about facial expressions when 
they view their own face compared to the face of a friend 
or a stranger (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin,  2004; 
Ma & Han, 2010), and when information relevant to the self 
is memorised, it is processed elaboratively and hence more 
reliably retained (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Rogers, Kuiper, 
& Kirker,  1977). This phenomenon has been termed “the 
self-reference effect”. The self-reference effect has been ev-
idenced through the use of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) techniques, which show that self-relevant 
stimuli specifically evoke increased activation of the self-re-
lated region of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as well as 
the memory associated brain regions such as the posterior 
cingulate cortex and bilateral angular gyrus (Yaoi, Osaka, & 
Osaka, 2015).
The influence of self-relevance in information process-
ing has been previously explored. Dichotic listening exper-
iments (Moray,  1959) showed that participants struggle to 
recall neutral speech from an unattended channel, unless 
their own name is mentioned. Further studies (Bargh, 1982; 
cherry,  1953; Wood & Cowan,  1995) similarly reported 
the superordinate influence of self-concept; however, the 
use of autobiographical information, such as a participants 
own name, risks confounding self-reference and familiarity 
effects.
More recent research has avoided confounding self-ref-
erence and familiarity through the use of geometric shape 
stimuli arbitrarily assigned to “self” and “other” conditions. 
Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012; see also Stolte, Humphreys, 
Yankouskaya, & Sui, 2017) conducted a study in which healthy 
participants associated three different geometric shapes with 
the pronouns “you”, “friend” and “stranger”. For example, at 
the start of the experiment participants were instructed “you 
are a triangle, a stranger is a square, and Mary [the partici-
pant's best friend] is a circle.” Shape pronoun pairs were then 
presented for 100 milliseconds (ms), and participants were 
asked to indicate if the shape matched with its original pro-
noun association as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
Results showed a significant advantage for “you” compared 
to “friend” and “stranger” pairings, reflected through higher 
accuracy and faster reaction times. Stolte et al. (2017) con-
ducted a further experiment in which participants associated 
a new set of shapes with happy, sad and neutral facial ex-
pressions. Shape face pairs were then presented for 100ms. 
Results showed a significant advantage for “happy” com-
pared to “sad” and “neutral” pairings. Together, the results 
evidence separate biases towards self-referential (“you”) and 
positive (happy face) stimuli in healthy individuals.
Specific emotion-related attentional biases have been 
observed in depressive disorders. Depressed participants 
have been shown to exhibit hypoattention to positive 
stimuli, hyperattention to negative stimuli or a combi-
nation of the two, at different time scales (Krompinger 
& Simmons,  2009; Kuiper & Derry,  1982; McCabe & 
Gotlib, 1995; Milders et al., 2016; Segal, Gemar, Truchon, 
Guirguis, & Horowitz, 1995).Further research has suggested 
that depressed participants exhibit hypoattention to both 
positive and negative stimuli, termed as Emotion Context 
Insensitivity (ECI [Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib,  2005]). 
ECI posits that depressed individuals exhibit a general 
blunted response to emotion, and situates depressive char-
acteristics within an evolutionary framework. Whilst ECI 
is a relatively unexplored phenomenon, a meta-analysis 
of emotional reactivity in depressive disorders conducted 
by Bylsma, Morris, and Rottenberg (2008) concluded 
that depression is characterised by hypoattention to both 
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positive and negative stimuli, in accordance with ECI the-
ory. However, it should be noted that whilst the meta-anal-
ysis used three methods to assess emotional reactivity 
(self-report assessment of emotion, emotional behavioural 
responses measured through electromyography [EMG] and 
physiological measures), only participants’ self-report as-
sessment of emotion and emotional behavioural responses 
showed evidence of ECI. Whilst there have been significant 
advances in methods used to investigate cognition since the 
study's inception, ECI has seldom been explored in recent 
research.
In the context of exploring ECI, contrasting emotion-re-
lated attentional biases have been observed between healthy 
and depressed individuals. Healthy individuals tend to ex-
hibit a bias towards positive stimuli. This is evidenced by 
a meta-analysis conducted by Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, 
and Sander (2016). The analysis included a total sample 
size of 9,120 healthy participants and found evidence of a 
significant bias towards positive over negative and neutral 
stimuli. In contrast, individuals with depression exhibited 
hypoattention towards positive stimuli. This is evidenced 
by McCabe and Gotlib (1995) who conducted a deploy-
ment of attention task in which positive, negative and neu-
tral word pairs were presented for 750 ms. The words were 
then replaced by two different coloured bars, with partici-
pants required to indicate which coloured bar appeared first. 
Results showed that control participants were significantly 
more likely to correctly identify the colour of bars first ap-
pearing in the location of positive words, indicating a bias 
towards positive stimuli. In contrast, depressed participants 
attended to positive, negative and neutral stimuli equally. 
This research is further supported by Milders et al. (2016) 
who conducted an attentional blink task in which happy 
and sad faces were presented for 100 ms. Results showed 
that depressed participants detected significantly fewer 
happy faces compared to control participants. Together, 
these studies indicate that individuals with depression dis-
play hypoattention towards positive stimuli in comparison 
to healthy individuals, manifesting as a reduced bias to-
wards positivity.
Whilst a range of research has evidenced a depression 
specific hypoattention towards positive “impersonal” stimuli, 
little recent research incorporates stimuli that are simultane-
ously emotional and self-relevant. Kuiper and Derry (1982) 
conducted an earlier study in which participants made ei-
ther self-referential (“does this word apply to you?”) or se-
mantic (“does this word have specific meaning?”) ratings 
on depressed themed (negative) and non-depressed themed 
(positive) words. Participants then completed an inciden-
tal recall task. The control group showed better recall for 
self-referenced non-depressed words compared to self-refer-
enced depressed words and semantic words. In contrast, de-
pressed participants showed enhanced recall for both types 
of self-referenced words compared to semantic words. These 
findings suggest that compared to healthy individuals, in-
dividuals with depression exhibit hypoattention to positive 
self-referential stimuli.
In contrast to ECI, other research evidences a depression 
specific hyperattention to negative stimuli. Krompinger and 
Simmons (2009) used a go/no go paradigm in which positive 
and negative stimuli (pleasant and unpleasant colour images 
obtained from the International Affective Picture System) 
were presented for 300  ms. Results showed that depressed 
participants uniquely exhibited larger P300 amplitudes in re-
sponse to negative stimuli compared to positive stimuli and 
hence allocated more attentional resources to the former. 
However, this study did not include a self-referential compo-
nent. Neither did it include a neutral baseline. It is therefore 
not possible to differentiate between a magnified negative 
attentional bias and reduced positive attentional bias. Segal 
et  al.  (1995) conducted a modified Stroop colour naming 
task in which positive and negative adjectives primed by 
emotional statements with varying levels of self-reference 
were presented for 2,000 ms. Depressed participants showed 
slower colour naming latencies for negative adjectives primed 
by self-descriptive statements compared to any other target 
condition. No differences were observed amongst control 
participants. This indicates that the depressed participants 
struggled to disengage from negative self-referential stimuli. 
In explanation, it is proposed that negative stimuli are more 
congruent with depressed participants’ negative self-per-
ception (Cavanagh & Geisler,  2006; Ilardi, Atchley, Enloe, 
Kwansy, & Garratt, 2007). The majority of recent research 
exploring depression specific negative attentional biases have 
used “impersonal” as opposed to self-referential stimuli.
In summary, past research has shown that whilst both 
self-referential and emotional stimuli gain preferential access 
to attentional resources, self-relevance in perception is influ-
ential in dictating the salience of emotional stimuli at later 
stages of information processing. Whilst recent research has 
avoided confounding self-reference and familiarity effects 
through the use of arbitrary geometric shape stimuli assigned 
to “self” and “other” conditions, the influence of self-percep-
tion on emotional salience has not yet been explored using 
this paradigm. Given the central role of low self-esteem and 
the experience of emotional distress in depression, it is sur-
prising that little research has explored the combined effect 
of self-perception and emotion in depressive disorders. This 
study therefore aimed to investigate if self-perception influ-
ences emotional salience to produce depression specific cog-
nitive biases, through the attribution of “self” or “other” to 
emotional stimuli that avoids familiarity confounds. This was 
achieved through using geometric shape stimuli arbitrarily 
assigned to “self” or “other” conditions that were addition-
ally filled with emotional face drawings. This study incorpo-
rated neutral face drawings in order to avoid limitations faced 
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in previous studies that result from no baseline comparison 
measure.
2 |  MATERIALS AND METHOD
2.1 | Participants
All participants had normal or corrected to-normal vision 
and gave informed written consent prior to the experiment. 
The study was approved by the University Research Ethics 
Committee and the Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
of Oxford Brookes University (reference number 1718/122). 
All participants gave written informed consent approved 
by the Research Ethics Committee, in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2 | Eligibility
The eligibility of participants and the allocation of partici-
pants to groups were determined by the Mini International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I., Sheenan & 
Lecrubier,  2006). Both control and depressed participants 
were recruited from a community sample. The M.I.N.I. was 
conducted by an experienced clinical psychologist, and 20% of 
the interview was discussed with an experienced psychiatrist 
to validate diagnostic criteria. The M.I.N.I. is a structured in-
terview for the major Axis I psychiatric disorders as specified 
by the Diagnostic Manual of Mental Disorders 4th Edition 
(DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The in-
terview is used for research assessment purposes and shows 
high validity and reliability scores with more comprehensive 
psychological assessments such as the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Patient Edition (SCID-P, 
First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002). Four participants 
were excluded based on information given during the M.I.N.I. 
A further three participants were excluded from behavioural 
analysis as they did not engage with the computer-based task. 
Participants who engaged with the task but showed low lev-
els of accuracy and/or slow reaction times were not excluded. 
We found no theoretical reason to justify exclusion, because 
participant accuracy and reaction times may differ as a result 
of various factors (Caligiuri & Ellwanger,  2000; Schubert, 
Gidon, Hagemann, & Voss, 2016). Furthermore, our results 
section displays individual participant scores, as well as the 
group means, which allows for a higher level of granularity 
when interpreting the results. After exclusions twenty par-
ticipants with no history of neurological or psychiatric illness 
were recruited to the control group (six male; 19 to 52 years 
of age, M = 29.85 ± 11.69). Twenty participants with a pri-
mary diagnosis of unipolar major depressive disorder were 
recruited to the depressed group (two male; 18 to 45 years 
of age, M = 24.30 ± 6.99). Whilst the overall sample size is 
small for a clinical study, our methodology was based on pre-
vious studies using similar experimental paradigms (Stolte 
et al., 2017; Sui, Ohrling, & Humphreys, 2016). Whilst dif-
ferences in age and gender may impact reaction time and 
hence task performance (Bleecker, Bolla-Wilson, Agnew, 
& Myers,  2009), all efforts were made to ensure that age 
and gender differences between experimental groups were 
minimal.
The M.I.N.I was additionally used to assess anxiety co-
morbidity. Within the depressed group, 9 out of 20 partic-
ipants exhibited a secondary generalised anxiety disorder 
(GAD) comorbidity. The control group exhibited no anxiety. 
The depressed group had a significantly higher number of 
participants who met the criteria for GAD compared to the 
control group (χ2 = 11.6, p < .01).
2.3 | Secondary measures
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II, Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996) was used to confirm the depression status of 
participants initially determined by the M.I.N.I. The BDI-II 
explores affective, cognitive and somatic symptoms of de-
pression and contains 21 items on a 4-point scale from 0 
(symptoms absent) to 3 (symptoms severe). In non-clinical 
populations, scores above 20 indicate the presence of depres-
sion. For those diagnosed with depression, a score between 0 
and 13 indicates no depression, 14–19 low depression, 20–28 
moderate depression and 29–63 severe depression (Jackson-
Koku, 2016). 19 out of 20 participants in the control group 
scored below the cut-off point for depression in non-clinical 
populations (<20, [M = 5.50, range = 1–30]). The participant 
who scored above the cut-off point for depression was evalu-
ated during the M.I.N.I. by two experienced clinicians and 
was not deemed to meet the criteria for a depressive disor-
der. There was also evidence of response bias on the BDI-II 
self-report measure for this participant. Within the depressed 
group, all participants met the criteria for mild depression at 
a minimum (>14 [M = 28.6, range = 7–46]). Ordinal regres-
sion analysis showed that group (control/depressed) predicts 
BDI-II score outcome (R2McF = 0.169, χ2 = 41.1, p < .01).
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) was 
used to assess participant self-esteem. It is a 10-item scale 
that measures global self-worth through evaluating positive 
and negative feelings about the self. All items are answered 
using a 4-point Likert scale format (strongly disagree, dis-
agree, agree or strongly agree). Higher scores indicate higher 
self-esteem. Items 2,5,6,8 and 9 are reverse scored. Scores 
range from 10 (very low) to 40 (very high). The depressed 
group (M  =  22.65, range  =  16–36) scored significantly 
lower on the trait self-esteem scale compared to the con-
trol group (M = 32.05, range = 21–39). Ordinal regression 
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analysis showed that group (control/depressed) predicts trait 
self-esteem scale score outcome (R2McF = 0.130, χ2 = 29.5, 
p < .01).
2.4 | Stimuli and tasks
All stimuli were presented in white on a light grey back-
ground on 17-inch monitors (1,280 × 960 pixels at 60 Hz), 
using E-prime software. One of two filled, geometric shapes 
(selected from six possible shapes: circle, triangle, diamond, 
pentagon, hexagon, octagon [Figure 1a]) was presented to-
gether with the word “self” or “other”, referring to the par-
ticipant's self or a stranger. The shapes additionally contained 
a line drawing of a happy, sad or neutral facial expression 
(Figure 1b). The shapes (3.3° × 3.3° of visual angle) were 
always presented 1.1° above a fixation cross (0.3° × 0.3°), 
whilst labels were presented at 1.7° below the fixation cross. 
Participants judged whether the shape matched the label, ac-
cording to the original label-shape pairing.
2.5 | Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment, written instructions 
asked participants to remember the two label-shape pair-
ings (e.g. “self  =  square”,  “other  =  circle”). The specific 
assignment of people to shapes was counterbalanced across 
participants. This was followed by a training phase (12 tri-
als) where only shapes and labels were presented without 
faces depicting an emotion, as participants learnt the asso-
ciation between shape and label (“self” and “other”). In the 
matching phase, participants were asked to make a speeded 
response to a shape-label pair, judging whether the pair 
matched or not. Each shape was additionally filled with a 
line drawing of a face depicting a positive, negative or neu-
tral emotion which was not task relevant. On a random half 
of the trials the shape-label pair matched, and on the other 
half they did not.
The order of presentation for each shape-label pair was 
randomised. At the beginning of each trial a fixation cross 
was presented in the middle of the screen (randomised for 
800–1,200  ms) followed by a label-shape pair, with the 
shape containing a face drawing (150  ms). The pair ei-
ther conformed to the written instructions given at the be-
ginning of the experiment or it was a recombination of a 
label with a different, nonmatching shape. Participants had 
1150 ms to respond from the first appearance of the stimuli 
(Figure 2). During this interval, participants judged whether 
the correct shape had been assigned to the self or other 
condition by pressing one of two response keys as quickly 
and as accurately as possible. Subsequently, feedback (cor-
rect, incorrect or no response) was provided on the screen 
for 500 ms. Participants completed six blocks of 150 trials 
and a final block of 60 trials each (80 trials per condition; 
happy self-match, happy self-nonmatch, neutral self-match, 
neutral self-nonmatch, sad self-match, sad self-nonmatch, 
happy other-match, happy other-nonmatch, neutral oth-
er-match, neutral other-nonmatch, sad other-match, sad 
other-nonmatch).
2.6 | Behavioural analysis
The data obtained were used to compute two measures of 
performance: measure one: sensitivity index (discriminabil-
ity-d′) and measure two: efficiency index (drift rate-v).
2.7 | Measure one: Sensitivity index 
(discriminability-d′)
A signal detection approach (Spencer & Barrett, 2014) was 
employed to compute d′ for each association, combining 
performance for matched pairs (hits) with performance from 
nonmatched pairs containing the same shape (false alarms). A 
higher d′ value shows increased discriminability for a given 
stimulus. This can be achieved through correctly matching 
pairs more often (hit rate) and/or incorrectly matching non-
matched pairs less often (false alarm rate).
F I G U R E  1  (a) Geometric shape stimuli. (b) Happy, sad and 
neutral emotional face stimuli
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The equation for calculating d′ is as follows; d′ = Z(hit rate) 
– Z (false alarm rate), where Z is the inverse cumulative distribu-
tion function of the normal distribution. We used d′ rather than 
considering the accuracy of matched pairs because this measure 
is not subject to a participant's bias to either select “matched” or 
“nonmatched” more frequently. For example, a participant who 
always selected “matched” would show a 100% accuracy rate 
for matched pairs, but a 0% accuracy rate for nonmatched pairs. 
Thus, only considering the accuracy rate on matched pairs may 
be susceptible to participants’ response biases.
Mean discriminability was calculated per participant for 
each of the six conditions (happy self, sad self, neutral self, 
happy other, sad other and neutral other) via matched and 
nonmatched trials. In cases where a participant made no false 
alarms (correctly identifying that a shape does not match 
with a given label 100% of the time), their false alarm score 
was corrected to 1/2N. In cases where a participant made no 
hit rate errors (correctly identifying that a shape matches with 
a given label 100% of the time) their hit rate score was cor-
rected to 1-(1/2N). In both cases, N = 80 (the number of trials 
for each condition). Correct responses with reaction times 
faster than 200ms were excluded from analysis (<0.0001% 
in total).
For analysis one, mixed measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) were performed on the d′ data. The between sub-
jects variable was group (control/depressed). The within sub-
jects variables were shape category (self/other) and emotion 
valence (happy/sad/neutral).
For analysis two, the value of neutral d′ (acting as a base-
line for each participant) was subtracted from the happy and 
sad d′ values for “self” and “other” separately in order to pro-
duce an “emotional bias” (EB) score based on discriminabil-
ity. Positive scores reflect a greater discriminability for happy 
and sad faces compared to neutral faces and thus a greater 
sensitivity to emotion.
2.8 | Measure two: Efficiency index (drift 
rate-v)
The EZ diffusion model (Wagenmakers, Van Der Maas, & 
Grasman,  2007) was used to compute drift rate (v). Drift 
rate estimates the rate of information acquisition. Thus, it 
is used as a measure of perceptual processing speed, and 
therefore efficiency, during decision-making. A higher 
v value shows increased efficiency in decision-making. 
The model determines v using the values of mean reaction 
time, variance in reaction time and proportion of correct 
responses. The same values are used to calculate boundary 
separation (a). As a participant's drift rate score incorpo-
rates mean reaction time, variance in reaction time and the 
proportion of correct responses, it reflects trade-offs made 
between speed and accuracy in a way that basic reaction 
time measures cannot.
The model stipulates that reaction time responses show 
a degree of right skew that the relative speed of correct and 
error responses  are  similar and that the starting point z is 
intermediate between two responses. The starting point z is 
calculated such that z  =  a/2, where a  =  boundary separa-
tion. These requirements were met by all data (Figures  S1 
and S2). Results of a t-test showed that correct and incor-
rect reaction times did not differ significantly per participant, 
(t[39] = 1.86, p = .243). A scaling parameter of 0.1 was used 
in calculating the drift rate. The scaling parameter is such 
that if all other parameters are halved along with the scaling 
parameter, then the result does not change. Thus, the choice 
of the scaling parameter is arbitrary and does not affect the 
statistical inferences.
The mean drift rate was calculated for each of the six 
conditions (happy self, sad self, neutral self, happy other, 
sad other and neutral other) for matched trials only. Correct 
response times with reaction times faster than 200 ms were 
F I G U R E  2  Schematic example of the 
experimental trial sequence
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excluded from analysis (<0.0001% in total). In the case of 
the reaction time variance calculation, values ± 3 standard 
deviations (SD) from the mean were excluded as they may 
exert undue influence on the model.
For analysis one, ANOVAs were performed on the v 
data. The between subjects variable was group (control/de-
pressed). The within subjects variables were shape category 
(self/other) and emotion valence (happy/sad/neutral). For 
analysis two, the value of neutral v (acting as a baseline for 
each participant) was then subtracted from the happy and sad 
v values for self and other separately in order to produce an 
EB score based on drift rate. Positive scores reflect increased 
perceptual processing speed for happy and sad faces com-
pared to neutral faces and thus suggest a more efficient deci-
sion-making process in response to emotion.
3 |  RESULTS
3.1 | Analysis one
Mixed measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were per-
formed on d′ and v data. The between subjects variable was 
group (control/depressed). The within subject variables were 
shape category (self/other) and emotion valence (happy/sad/
neutral).
3.2 | Discriminability (d′) data
An ANOVA on the d′ data showed a highly significant main 
effect for shape category (self/other) F1,38 = 90.90, p < .001, 
n2 = 0.167, reflecting a higher d′ for self-pairings. This sug-
gests that participants exhibited a greater sensitivity to “self” 
compared to “other” pairings regardless of group. Within the 
control group 16/20 participants exhibited a higher d′ value 
for self compared to other pairings across every emotion 
condition. Of the four remaining participants, two partici-
pants exhibited a lower d′ value for self compared to other 
pairings across all emotion conditions. Within the depressed 
group 19/20 participants exhibited a higher d′ value for self 
compared to other pairings across every emotion condition. 
The remaining participant exhibited a higher d′ value for self 
compared to other pairings for one out of the three emotion 
conditions (Figure 3a and b).
The analysis further showed a significant interaction ef-
fect between shape category (self/other) and emotion valence 
(happy/sad/neutral) F2,76 = 3.23, p = .045, n
2 = 0.001, and 
between group (control/depressed) and emotion valence 
(happy/sad/neutral) F2,76 =3.90, p = .024, n
2 = 0.001.
To understand these interactions further, ANOVAs were 
performed on the d′ data for self and other pairings separately 
and for the control and depressed groups separately.
An ANOVA on the d′ data (“self”) showed no significant 
main effect of emotion, F2,78 = 2.32, p = .105, n
2 = 0.002. 
An ANOVA on the d′ data (“other”) showed no significant 
main effect of emotion, F2,78 = 2.18, p = .119, n
2 = 0.001. A 
lack of significance in the “self” and “other” ANOVAs de-
spite a significant interaction effect between shape category 
and emotion is likely due to the control and depressed groups 
being considered simultaneously, for each “self” and “other” 
ANOVA. Thus, participant group is acting as a confounding 
variable. This is indicated by the subsequent ANOVA, which 
showed that participants’ sensitivity to emotional valence act 
in opposing directions when considering the control and de-
pressed groups independently; whilst control participants in 
general showed higher d′ values for the happy emotion con-
dition, depressed participants in general showed the higher d′ 
values for the neutral emotion condition.
An ANOVA on the d′ data (control group, [Figure  5]) 
showed a significant main effect of emotion, F2,78  =  3.92, 
p = .024, n2 = 0.002. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons indi-
cated that the mean d′ value for the happy emotion condition 
(M = 1.70) was significantly higher than the mean d′ value for 
the neutral emotion condition (M = 1.56). 14/20 participants 
in the control group exhibited a higher d′ value for happy 
emotion conditions compared to neutral emotion conditions. 
An ANOVA on the d′ data (depressed group [Figure  5]) 
showed no main effect of emotion. F2,78 = 0.37, p =  .689, 
n2 = 0.000. 10/20 participants in the depressed group exhib-
ited a higher d′ value for happy emotion conditions compared 
to neutral emotion conditions.
3.3 | Drift rate (v) data
An ANOVA on the v data showed a highly significant main 
effect of shape category (self/other) F1,38 = 91.42, p < .001, 
n2  =  0.315, reflecting more efficient decision-making pro-
cesses in response to self-pairings over other pairings regard-
less of group. Within the control group, 17/20 participants 
exhibited a higher v value for “self” compared to “other” 
pairings across every emotion condition. Of the three remain-
ing participants, one participant showed a lower v value for 
self compared to other pairings across all emotion conditions. 
Within the depressed group, 20/20 participants exhibited a 
higher v value for self compared to other pairings across 
every emotion condition (Figure 4a and b).
The analysis also showed a significant interaction effect 
between group and emotion valence F2,76 = 3.92, p = .024, 
n2 = 0.002. To understand this interaction further, ANOVAs 
were performed on the v data for the control and depressed 
groups separately. An ANOVA on the v data (control group, 
[Figure  5]) showed a significant main effect of emotion, 
F2,78 = 4.17, p = .019, n
2 = 0.003. Bonferonni post hoc com-
parisons showed that the mean v value for the happy emotion 
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condition (M = 0.17) was significantly higher than the mean v 
value for the neutral emotion condition (M = 0.15), p = .039. 
14/20 participants in the control group exhibited a higher v 
value for the happy emotion condition compared to neutral 
emotion conditions. In addition, the mean v value for the 
happy emotion condition (M  =  0.17) was significantly 
higher than the mean v value for the sad emotion condition 
(M = 0.15), p = .048. 15/20 participants in the control group 
F I G U R E  3  (a) d′ per participant across three emotion conditions from self and other perspective. Red shapes denote the group mean. (b) d′ 
per participant across three emotion conditions from self and other perspective. Lines demonstrate pairwise comparisons
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exhibited a higher v value for the happy emotion condition 
compared to the sad emotion condition.
An ANOVA on the v data (depressed group, [Figure 5]) 
showed no main effect of emotion. F2,78 = 2.18, p =  .119, 
n2 = 0.001. 6/20 participants in the depressed group exhib-
ited a higher v value for the happy emotion condition com-
pared to the neutral emotion condition. 9/20 participants in 
the depressed group exhibited a higher v value for the happy 
emotion condition compared to the sad emotion condition.
3.4 | Analysis two (bias scores)
ANOVAs were performed on the change in discriminability 
(∆d′) and the change in drift rate (∆v) from the neutral face 
F I G U R E  3  (Continued)
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stimuli compared to the happy or sad face stimuli. The be-
tween subjects variable was group (control/ depressed). The 
within subject variables were shape category (self/other) 
and EB (happy/sad). Analysis two was incorporated to en-
sure that participants were compared to their own baseline.
3.5 | Discriminability (d′) data
An ANOVA on the ∆d′ data showed a highly significant 
main effect of group (control/depressed) F1,38  =  8.64, 
p = .006, η2 = 0.0.185, reflecting a higher ∆d′ for the control 
F I G U R E  4  (a) v per participant across three emotion conditions from self and other perspective. Red shapes denote the group mean. (b) v per 
participant across three emotion conditions from self and other perspective. Lines demonstrate pairwise comparisons
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group (Figure 6). This suggests that the control group ex-
hibited an increased sensitivity to emotional faces compared 
to the depressed group, regardless of shape category (self/
other) and EB (happy/sad). 15/20 participants in the control 
group exhibited a greater sensitivity to happy over neutral 
faces (self-condition), compared to 11/20 in the depressed 
group. 13/20 participants in the control group exhibited a 
greater sensitivity to sad over neutral faces (self-condition), 
compared to 8/20 in the depressed group. 10/20 participants 
in the control group exhibited a greater sensitivity to happy 
over neutral faces (other condition) compared to 10/20 par-
ticipants in the depressed group. 12/20 participants in the 
control group exhibited a greater sensitivity to sad over 
neutral faces (other condition) compared to 10/20 in the de-
pressed group.
F I G U R E  4  (Continued)
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The analysis showed a significant interaction between 
shape category (self/other) and EB (happy/sad) F1,38 = 6.37, 
p  =  .016, η2  =  0.143. There were no further significant 
interactions.
To understand this interaction further, ANOVAs were 
performed on the ∆d′ data for self and other pairings 
separately. An ANOVA on the ∆d′ data (“self”) showed 
a main effect of emotion approaching significance, 
F1,39 = 3.46, p = .071, n
2 = 0.016. An ANOVA on the ∆d′ 
data (“other”) showed a main effect of emotion approach-
ing significance, F1,39 = 3.10, p = .086, n
2 = 0.029. A lack 
of significance in the “self” and “other” ANOVAs despite 
F I G U R E  5  Mean d′ and v per participant across two emotion conditions: self and other combined
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a significant interaction effect between shape category and 
emotion is again likely due to the control and depressed 
groups being considered simultaneously for each “self” and 
“other” ANOVA. Thus, participant group is again acting as 
a confounding variable. Whilst the control group showed the 
largest ∆d′ difference for the happy emotion condition, the 
depressed group showed the largest ∆d′ difference for the 
sad emotion condition.
F I G U R E  6  Mean ∆d′ per participant for happy and sad emotional biases from self and other perspective. Red shapes denote the group mean
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3.6 | Efficiency (v) data
An ANOVA on the ∆v data showed a highly significant ef-
fect of group (control/depressed) F1,38  =  8.11, p  =  .007, 
η2  =  0.176 (Figure  7). There were no further significant 
interactions. This suggests that the control group exhibited 
increased efficiency in decision-making in response to emo-
tional faces compared to the depressed group, regardless of 
shape category (self/other) and EB (happy/sad). 13/20 par-
ticipants in the control group exhibited increased efficiency 
F I G U R E  7  Mean ∆v per participant for happy and sad emotional biases from self and other perspective. Red shapes denote the group mean
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in decision-making in response to happy faces compared to 
neutral faces (self-condition), compared to 11/20 in the de-
pressed group. 10/20 participants in the control group exhib-
ited increased efficiency in decision-making in response to 
sad faces compared to neutral faces (self-condition), com-
pared to 7/20 in the depressed group. 12/20 participants in 
the control group exhibited increased efficiency in decision-
making in response to happy faces compared to neutral 
faces (other condition), compared to 7/20 in the depressed 
group.11/20 participants in the control group exhibited in-
creased efficiency in decision-making in response to sad 
faces compared to neutral faces (other condition), compared 
to 7/20 in the depressed group.
4 |  DISCUSSION
Information processing research has shown that self-rel-
evant stimuli receive preferential access to attentional re-
sources (Alexopoulos et  al.,  2012; Gray  et  al.,  2004; Ma 
& Han,  2010). In addition, emotional stimuli are shown 
to more effectively capture attention compared to neutral 
stimuli (Leppänen & Hietanen, 2003; Pourtois, Schettino, & 
Vuilleumier, 2013). The separate influences of self-referen-
tial and emotional stimuli on attentional allocation in healthy 
participants have been explored by Stolte et al., (2017) who 
found evidence of separate attentional biases towards self-
referential and emotional (happy face) stimuli. This study 
first aimed to investigate if self-relevance in perception acts 
as a superordinate schema to influence emotional salience, 
and second aimed to investigate if self-relevance in percep-
tion influences emotional salience in depressive disorders 
specifically.
4.1 | The influence of self-perception on 
emotional salience
The results from analysis one show that participants exhib-
ited a highly significant bias towards self-relevant pairings 
compared to other-relevant pairings, regardless of group and 
emotion  condition.  These  results lend  support to research 
which  suggests that self-perception acts as a superordinate 
schema. This may influence the perceived salience of emo-
tional stimuli at later stages of information processing (Chen 
et  al.,  2014; Zhou et  al.,  2017); however, no clear interac-
tions between “self”/“other” concept and emotional valence 
were observed in this study. Furthermore, we suggest that the 
influence of “self” is solely a reflection of participants’ inter-
nalised self-schema, because this study avoided confound-
ing self-reference and familiarity. This finding is particularly 
informative because whilst previous studies have used more 
basic measures such as reaction time and discriminability 
(d′) to index bias (Stolte et al., 2017; Sui et al., 2012), the 
drift rate (v) measure used in the current study was calculated 
using correct response proportion, reaction time and reaction 
time variance. Hence, the measure better reflects trade-offs 
between speed and accuracy. This study has therefore found 
evidence of a superordinate  self-bias  using a more robust 
analysis method.
Furthermore, the results show that participants exhib-
ited a highly significant bias towards self-relevant pairings 
compared to other-relevant pairings, regardless of group. If 
an intimate relationship between self-perception and positive 
emotion exists, an attenuated  self-bias  effect could reason-
ably be expected in depressed compared to control partici-
pants given the central role of negative self-perception and 
low self-esteem in depressive disorders (Clark et al., 1999; 
Orth & Robins,  2013; World Health Organization,  1992). 
However, a depression specific attenuated self-bias was not 
observed in the current study. This supports Stolte et  al.’s 
(2017) notion that independent processes underlie self and 
positive emotion biases. Our results are further supported 
by  evidence  of separable neural mechanisms for “self” 
and emotion. Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, and Kelly 
(2006) showed that whilst self-relevant stimuli promote ac-
tivity in the medial prefrontal cortex, the emotional valence 
of stimuli promotes activity in the ventral anterior cingulate 
cortex. There is therefore emerging evidence to suggest that 
self-relevance and emotional valence are processed in differ-
ent brain regions.
4.2 | Depression specific hypoattention to 
positive stimuli
Our results showed that compared to the control group, the 
depressed group exhibited significantly reduced “happy self” 
and “happy other” biases. This was reflected in lower sen-
sitivity and less efficient decision-making processes in re-
sponse to happy faces in comparison to neutral faces for both 
“self” and “other” conditions.
Moreover, whilst overall the control group exhibited sig-
nificantly higher sensitivity and efficiency in decision-making 
processes in response to happy faces in comparison to neutral 
faces, the depressed group did not. These findings support 
experimental research which shows that depressed partici-
pants display hypoattention to positive stimuli (McCabe & 
Gotlib, 1995; Milders et al., 2016). Earlier research by Kuiper 
and Derry (1982) suggests that depressed participants show 
hypoattention to positive self-relevant information specifi-
cally. Whilst our results showed that the difference in “happy 
self” bias magnitude for the control and depressed groups 
was greater than the difference in “happy other” bias mag-
nitude, the difference in magnitudes was not significant. We 
are therefore unable to provide further evidence in support 
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of Kuiper and Derry’s (1982) work, although our findings 
suggest that further research in this area may be warranted.
4.3 | Emotion context insensitivity
A depression specific hyperattention to sad face stimuli 
was not observed in this study. In explanation, this may be 
because hyperattention to negative stimuli is more com-
monly observed at longer stimulus presentations (De 
Raedt & Koster, 2010; Duque & Vázquez, 2015; Shane & 
Peterson,  2007). It has been proposed that rather than ini-
tially orienting towards negative self-referential information, 
individuals with depression may struggle to disengage from 
it in time. This may manifest as increased rumination over 
negative self-relevant information, which in turn induces low 
mood (Segal et al., 1995). Further research could explore this 
possibility using the current paradigm through presenting 
label-shape pairings at longer stimulus presentations.
Interestingly, our results evidenced a depression specific 
hypoattention to negative (sad face) as well as positive (happy 
face) stimuli, reflected in reduced “happy” and “sad” biases 
within the depressed group for both “self” and “other” con-
ditions. This general blunted response to emotion has been 
described previously as ECI by Rottenberg et al. (2005). Our 
findings further support earlier research conducted by Bylsma 
et al.  (2008), who concluded that depression is characterised 
by hypoattention to positive and negative stimuli simultane-
ously. The ECI evidenced in the current study does not con-
form to Beck’s (1967, 2008) cognitive theory of depression, 
whose emphasis remains on a rapid and involuntary bias to-
wards negative stimuli on account of  depressed individuals’ 
negative self-perception. Instead, a general blunted response to 
emotion may be the result of a demotivated mood state that di-
minishes the ability of depressed individuals to effectively re-
spond to social situations and emotional events. In explanation, 
evolutionary psychologists have suggested that a demotivated 
mood state may have served an adaptive function in Homo sa-
piens evolutionary history, in which humans would have com-
peted for social rank, resources and mates. In the event of a 
“loss” in any of these domains, depressive symptoms such as 
lethargy and social withdrawal may have served as a deterrent 
against further conflict, increasing the chances of individual 
survival (Hendrie & Pickles, 2009). However, in the absence 
of such pressures, depressive symptoms are maladaptive and 
damaging, reducing quality of life (Clark et al., 1999; Orth & 
Robins, 2013; World Health Organization, 1992).
4.4 | Methodological Implications
To understand biases directly “happy” and “sad” emotional 
bias scores were calculated by subtracting the neutral values 
from the happy and sad values of each measure for each par-
ticipant. This method has both advantages and limitations. 
The advantage of this method is that individual participant 
variation was to some extent accounted for because partici-
pants were compared to their own “baseline”. This baseline 
is important as certain measures; for example, drift rate and 
reaction time are susceptible to individual differences. Drift 
rate reflects rate of information acquisition, which is shown 
to correlate with cognitive ability, which varies between 
individuals (Schubert et  al.,  2016). Depressed participants 
may have exhibited longer reaction times on account of 
motor retardation, a symptom of depression experienced by 
40%–60% of sufferers (Caligiuri & Ellwanger, 2000).
The bias score calculation also created limitations. First, 
it may be that depressed participants paid more attention to 
neutral self-relevant stimuli compared to control participants 
purely because the stimuli lacked positivity. This would mean 
that the neutral values of each measure did not reflect a true 
“baseline”. Secondly, whilst self-referential emotion process-
ing was explored in analysis two, a true self-reference effect 
was not. In explanation, whilst any given participant could 
have exhibited a significantly lower drift rate for all “other” 
stimuli, compared to “self” stimuli, the difference would have 
been masked through the bias score calculation which re-
flects only the difference between neutral and positive stimuli 
(“happy bias”) and neutral and negative stimuli (“sad bias”) for 
each of the “self” and “other” conditions separately. However, 
this limitation was addressed through the inclusion of analysis 
one, which analysed happy, sad and neutral discriminability 
and efficiency values for each participant separately.
A further methodological limitation of this study it that 
whilst d′ and  v  measures were used to create an emotional 
“bias” score, d′ and v measure sensitivity and decision-mak-
ing  efficiency respectively. As such, the “biases” exhibited 
by participants may reflect different underlying cognitive 
constructs. A final limitation of this study is that  9  out of 
20  depressed participant's exhibited comorbid anxiety. This 
may have confounded results, as hypoattention to positive 
stimuli has been correlated with anxiety as well as depression 
(Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2010). As such, the hypoatten-
tion to positive stimuli observed in depressed participants may 
be the result of the dual effects of anxiety and depression on 
cognition. However, the attentional bias most often observed 
in anxious individuals is an orientation towards threat cues in 
visual search paradigms (Leppänen & Hietanen, 2003; Mogg 
& Bradley, 2005), neither of which were a feature of this study.
5 |  CONCLUSIONS AND 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
In this study, participants on average exhibited a bias towards 
self-relevant compared to other-relevant stimuli, regardless 
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of experimental group allocation. Furthermore, participants 
in the depressed group exhibited hypoattention to emotional 
stimuli in comparison to those in the control group, regard-
less of “self” or “other” relevance. This was reflected in their 
diminished “happy” and “sad” bias scores. This study has 
therefore not found evidence of a relationship between self-
bias and emotion bias in the context of depression.
Whilst a great deal of research has investigated the cog-
nitive biases underlying depression, a minority have incor-
porated self-referential components. Those studies which do, 
have often use autobiographical stimuli familiar to the par-
ticipant. This study used a novel perceptual matching task 
which avoids confounding self-reference and familiarity ef-
fects. Our results have shown that in general, both control and 
depressed participants exhibit a bias towards self-relevant 
compared to other-relevant stimuli.
Interestingly, depression specific biases towards neu-
tral faces over happy and sad faces were observed at short 
(150ms) stimulus presentations. Our findings do not there-
fore conform to Beck’s (1967, 2008) influential theory of 
depression, which suggests that individuals with depression 
show a rapid, automatic bias towards negative information. 
Instead, there is evidence that depressed participants exhibit 
generalised ECI at short stimulus presentations. ECI theory 
is a relatively uncharted phenomenon and would benefit from 
further research.
The majority of  current cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) techniques are modelled on Beck’s (1967) cognitive 
theory of depression and are focused primarily on modifying 
negative thoughts (National Health Service,  2016). Whilst 
CBT has been shown to be hugely beneficial for many suf-
ferers, it could be used in conjunction with new techniques 
that “train” depressed individuals to actively take stock of 
positive events and occurrences that healthy individuals ap-
pear to automatically attend to, increasing their receptivity to 
positive experiences.
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